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FOREWORD
This monograph analyzes one of the most crucial
U.S. security relationships. India is the most populous
democracy, while the United States is the oldest. India’s growing global influence generates new partnership opportunities regarding counterterrorism, regional security, foreign arms sales, and international
defense interoperability.
The U.S.-Indian relationship has greatly improved
under recent U.S. Presidential administrations, with
bipartisan support in the U.S. national security community. The previous Obama administration continued the process of building U.S.-Indian military ties
that began after the Cold War. Recent progress has
included deepening defense-industrial collaboration,
increasing intelligence sharing, expanding cooperation into East Asia, and normalizing U.S.-Indian
nuclear ties.
With the advent of a new U.S. Presidential administration, the value of strong U.S.-Indian security ties
persists. In the words of former Secretary of Defense
Ashton Carter, “the U.S.-India relationship is destined to be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st
century.”

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Since the Cold War, the United States and India
have overcome earlier impediments and substantially
strengthened their military, economic, and diplomatic
ties—advancing their mutual interests in defense industrial collaboration, combating terrorism, promoting democracy, preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and managing regional
security issues. U.S. Secretaries of Defense have seen
India as a potential partner on a range of security issues. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta called
India a “linchpin” of U.S. policy in Asia, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel termed India a security
provider “from the Indian Ocean to the greater Pacific,” and former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter
marked India as a natural partner of a “principled security network” in Asia.
The New Framework Agreement (NFA) for the
U.S.-Indian Defense Relationship, renewed in 2015,
has facilitated a growth in U.S.-Indian arms sales,
joint exercises, and military interactions. India has become one of the largest importers of U.S. arms. The
U.S.-Indian Defense Technology and Trade Initiative
(DTTI), launched in 2012, has expanded military technology transfer as well as defense co-production and
co-development. Several pilot projects have since been
launched under the Initiative’s auspices.
The United States has become the primary foreign exercise partner of the Indian Armed Forces
(IAF). Bilateral relations have intensified across all
military services and some civilian defense agencies.
U.S.-Indian naval exercises have increased military
interoperability, maritime domain awareness, and
mutual understanding of maritime procedures. The

xiii

U.S. and Indian armies have practiced counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance.
Furthermore, the two air forces have engaged in some
exercises. The U.S.-Indian counterterrorism partnership has expanded. U.S. and Indian officials now routinely share intelligence and best practices to counter
terrorist financing, enhance transportation security,
and respond to regional terrorist threats.
Yet, U.S.-Indian security collaboration must evolve
to address new challenges. In particular, the new U.S.
President Donald Trump’s administration should
take several steps to strengthen ties. In addition to
completing the implementation of negotiated agreements and furthering the reform of U.S. arms exports,
the Trump administration should take further steps to
develop the U.S.-Indian security agenda. For example,
Washington and New Delhi should impart more strategic rationale to joint exercises, discuss potential future missions and scenarios, engage more extensively
with other foreign partners, and increase the number
of army drills. More senior-level military and civilian
defense engagement can also profitably include homeland security, counterterrorism, nuclear security, biological threats, and cyber-defense cooperation.
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PROMOTING U.S.-INDIAN DEFENSE
COOPERATION: OPPORTUNITIES
AND OBSTACLES
This monograph analyzes the relationship between the United States and India to confirm progress, identify persistent obstacles, and suggest future
opportunities for defense and security cooperation in
the coming years. Bilateral security relations have improved substantially since the Cold War. Since then,
the two countries’ national security establishments
have partnered on arms sales, defense industrial projects, military exchanges, intelligence sharing, crisis
management, humanitarian responses, regional security issues, and countering nuclear proliferation and
terrorism. In the past decade, the two militaries have
participated in dozens of bilateral exercises and multinational drills, while senior defense officials from
both states have held regular consultations. Although
India has declined to become a formal member of the
U.S.-led international anti-terrorism coalition, Indian
Governments have supported many U.S. counterterrorism initiatives.
The Barack Obama administration had pursued
stronger U.S.-Indian security relations as a pillar of
its rebalancing to Asia policy, also known as the Asia
Pivot. The administration sought to increase the U.S.
military, diplomatic, and economic presence in Asia
in part by developing better relations with emerging
Asian powers such as India. Former U.S. Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter viewed India as a natural partner of the “principled security network” in the AsiaPacific region that the United States was building.1 In
August 2016, Carter said:
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the U.S.-India relationship is destined to be one of the
defining partnerships of the 21st century. We share so
much, so many interests and values, as well as a common vision for peace, for stability and prosperity in
the India—Indo-Asia-Pacific region.2

According to Carter, the United States has pursued
both a “strategic handshake” with India, “with the
United States reaching west in its rebalance, and India reaching east in Prime Minister Modi’s Act East
policy,” and a “technological handshake,” in which
both countries are driving toward “deeper and more
diverse defense co-development and co-production.”3
Nonetheless, India will likely remain a constrained
security partner of the United States in the coming
years due to historical and geographical differences.
For ideological and other reasons, Indian strategists
favor a multipolar world order. Yet, like U.S. leaders,
Indians generally understand that strengthening the
U.S.-Indian security partnership would bring benefits
for both countries. The bilateral national security relationship is mutually advantageous and capable of
helping both countries realize their core defense objectives, provided that U.S. and Indian policymakers
focus on pursuing their shared long-term goals in
regional stability and geopolitical pluralism.
TROUBLED HISTORY
The U.S.-Indian security and defense relationship
has seen marked improvements since the Cold War,
when Washington and New Delhi often found themselves on opposite sides of important issues. While
U.S. leaders sympathized with New Delhi’s drive
for independence from the British Empire, relations
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between the United States and India became strained
in the 1950s as Indian leaders strove for non-alignment
between east and west.4 The United States supported
New Delhi in the 1962 Sino-Indian War by providing
intelligence and other assistance.5 But in the 1970s,
then-President Richard Nixon and National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger pursued better relations
with China and Pakistan, culminating in U.S. support for Pakistan during its 1971 war with India—a
decision that strained U.S.-Indian relations for years.
The conflict drove India and Pakistan to seek nuclear
weapons, which, due to U.S. nonproliferation policies,
impeded U.S. security cooperation with both parties
and complicated Washington’s efforts to promote stability in South Asia.6 New Delhi’s tilt toward Moscow,
despite India’s commitment to non-alignment, also
posed a challenge for U.S.-Indian relations. During
the 1980s, the Reagan administration gave Pakistan
billions of dollars in economic and military aid to deter a Soviet attack on Pakistan, which was assisting
the armed resistance against the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan.7 The United States continued to provide
Pakistan with substantial additional military and economic assistance after the Cold War despite Washington’s limited influence over Islamabad’s foreign and
defense policies.8
Since the Soviet Union’s demise, Indian foreign
policy has become more autonomous and active in
the international security realm. Indian elites have
downplayed their commitment to non-alignment and
have come to see the United States as a useful partner
in their strategic diversification strategy.9 Under the
previous administrations of William Clinton, George
W. Bush, and Barack Obama, the United States and
India have achieved considerably stronger bilateral
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economic, political, and especially military ties. The
signing of the 10-year 2005 New Framework Agreement (NFA) for the U.S.-Indian Defense Relationship imparted significant momentum to that security
partnership. The agreement provides an overarching
structure through which the United States and India
have pursued more specific arrangements—including arms sales, military exercises, and other military
interactions. In 2006, the two governments signed the
Indo-U.S. Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation. In 2010, they launched a bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI).10 Additional bilateral cooperation mechanisms include the Defense Policy
Group (DPG) and its subgroups, the Defense Procurement and Production Group (DPPG), the Senior
Technology Security Group (STSG), the Joint Technical Group (JTG), and the Military Cooperation Group
(MCG) and its Executive Steering Groups (ESGs) in an
annual meeting of senior officers of the two countries’
armies, navies, and air forces.11 In their September
2013 U.S.-India Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation, both governments affirmed their mutual support
for fundamental principles of enhanced military collaboration.12 Under the Obama administration, Washington rebalanced its strategic orientation to devote
more resources to Asia. Obama became the first U.S.
president to visit India twice while in office; following his first trip in November 2010, he was the “chief
guest” at India’s Republic Day ceremony on January
26, 2015. The two governments renewed the NFA the
same year, modifying its terms to reflect changes in
the security environment since 2005.13 The new agreement, which continues until 2025, provides more support for military-to-military engagement, maritime
cooperation, and defense-academic partnerships.

4

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
India spends more on foreign weapons than any
other country (see Figures I-1 through I-4 in Appendix
I).14 The enormous volume of India’s purchases and
the country’s vast unmet defense needs guarantee that
India will remain an important arms buyer for years
to come. India is projected to surpass the United Kingdom in a few years to become the world’s third biggest
defense spender, after the United States and China.15
Despite India’s major arms purchases from the United States, Europe, and Israel, Russia remains India’s
leading foreign weapons supplier. Russia supplied 68
percent of India’s major arms purchases from 2012 to
2016. The United States lagged considerably behind,
providing only 14 percent of India’s imported weapons, with Israel occupying third place at 7 percent.
India is also the largest foreign purchaser of Russian
weapons, buying some 38 percent of Russian defense
exports. Furthermore, India is the lead foreign buyer
of Israeli weapons and the second-largest purchaser of
British exports.16
Indian officials have tried, with limited success,
to increase the amount of weapons the Indian Armed
Forces (IAF) purchases from indigenous defense companies. India’s national arms industry has improved
over time and manufactures a wider range of indigenous weapons systems than in previous decades. To
benefit the national defense industry, India’s national
Defense Procurement Policy (DPP) obliges foreign
defense companies to transfer substantial technology to domestic producers; give Indian firms a large
role in producing (under license), maintaining, and
repairing imported weapons systems; and reinvest
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sales revenue into the country’s state-owned or private defense companies. Indian officials have required
foreign firms to provide fewer turn-key systems (completed systems that clients can operate immediately).
Instead, they want foreign and Indian companies to
engage in more joint research, development, and manufacturing of new defense technologies and systems.
Indian negotiators often require that new contracts
stipulate a significant transfer of defense technologies to Indian firms.17 Indian Governments have long
sought to protect domestic defense producers such
as the Tata Group, Larsen & Toubro Limited, Bharat
Forge, Mahindra and Mahindra Limited, and Punj
Lloyd.18 They have also demanded large offsets—the
industrial compensation international firms are contractually obligated to pay foreign governments as a
condition of purchase, allowing governments to offset
the cost to the local economy of buying from a foreign
seller rather than a domestic firm. These payments
can include contracts that obligate the selling party to
invest a certain percentage of its revenue in the purchasing country’s economy, to purchase certain goods
produced by the buying country, or to transfer the
capability to produce certain technologies to the purchasing state.19
Despite these measures, India still purchases most
advanced military systems from foreign suppliers,
especially Russian companies. Indian defense firms
have found it difficult to transition from the development of successful prototypes to the serial production
of major indigenous weapons systems such as submarines, tanks, or combat aircraft.20 These companies
have struggled to produce high-quality weapons systems and have suffered recurring performance issues
and production delays. India’s offset requirements
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aim to raise national defense industrial capabilities,
but they can counterproductively deter foreign defense partnerships and investment. Indian companies
have yet to become leading weapons exporters, while
the government at times has had to set aside its defense modernization goals and simply buy foreign
weapons to meet high-priority requirements. For example, although India for years demanded technology transfer and domestic production in its tenders for
a Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), the
Indian Government eventually bought three-dozen
Rafale fighters in turn-key condition from the French
aerospace corporation Dassault to fill an urgent acquisition need.21 National security imperatives have also
mandated New Delhi’s continued reliance on foreign
arms. Indian military leaders have insisted that they
could not risk waiting until India develops some advanced indigenous weapons systems, such as critically needed fighter planes. India accordingly remains
heavily reliant on arms imports and has become one of
the world’s most competitive national arms markets.
The IAF have purchased over $10 billion worth of
U.S. weapons.22 In 2014, India was the second largest importer of U.S. arms, accounting for more than
11 percent of all U.S. arms sales worldwide, trailing
only Saudi Arabia.23 The largest deals have included
India’s acquisition of U.S.-made Apache (attack helicopters), Chinook (heavy-lift helicopters), C-130 Hercules (transport aircraft), and Boeing P-8I (long-range
maritime surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft), as
well as several other weapons systems.24 This surge in
U.S. arms sales helped boost bilateral trade in 2015 to
more than $100 billion and U.S. investment in India
that year to $35 billion.25 Although the U.S. and Indian
Governments have sought to increase defense indus-
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trial cooperation, the Indian bureaucracy’s resistance
to allowing substantial foreign direct investment
(FDI) in the country’s defense sector and other factors
initially limited progress.26 Prime Minister Narendra
Modi, who took office in May 2014, and the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) have launched a “Make in India”
program to increase Indian industries’ international
competitiveness.27 The new government views foreign
defense-related FDI more favorably for its potential to
strengthen domestic producers by better integrating
them into global supply chains, expanding their access to high technology, and creating a more competitive procurement environment that would encourage
national companies to become more efficient.28 In
July 2014, the government raised the ceiling for FDI
in India’s defense sector from 26 to 49 percent, with
higher limits for those foreign firms that transferred
the most valuable technology. The increase in FDI in
the defense sector has allowed U.S. producers to increase their arms sales to India.29 The result has been
record levels of FDI.30 Indian officials have said that
they might accept 100 percent foreign ownership of
defense projects in some cases, but have not specified
these conditions.31 Indeed, the Modi administration
has established ambitious targets for decreasing the
country’s dependence on weapons imports by developing the indigenous defense industry, with the goal
of eventually transforming India into a major arms exporter. In February 2015, the Modi administration set
the target of having 70 percent of all weapons used by
the IAF manufactured in India by 2020.32 The government revised the DPP to encourage strategic partnerships between domestic and foreign weapons producers with the objective of promoting greater foreign
investment and technology transfer to Indian arms
manufacturers. Indian officials also offered tax incen8

tives and other enticements to induce more Indian
small businesses to enter the defense market.
India’s defense industrial and procurement practices still create problems for foreign partners. India’s
weak national currency, uneven economic growth,
and high inflation in the defense sector create recurring
gaps between the IAF’s requirements and budget.33
In addition, the Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) constantly changes program requirements, arbitrarily cancels and re-issues tenders,
delays decisions, and favors public rather than private sector firms.34 U.S. analysts have routinely considered Indian demands for technology transfers and
offsets (whose typical rate for large defense contracts
is 30 percent) excessive, risky for foreign companies
without stronger protection for imported intellectual
property, and misguided given the Indian defense
industry’s limited capabilities.35 Foreign companies
worry about Indian firms’ inability to serve as system
integrators, lengthy production delays, and the other
performance problems that have historically characterized India’s defense industry.36 Additional challenges to greater U.S.-Indian arms sales cooperation
have included India’s continuing commitment to buying weapons from diverse foreign suppliers to avoid
dependency on any one of them; the established presence of strong foreign competitors such as Russia and
Israel that pledge to offer greater technology transfer;
the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations (which has
made U.S. officials more concerned about Russian access to any U.S. technologies provided to India); and
U.S. weapons sales to Pakistan.
The United States has been striving to meet Indian
requirements for offsets, technology transfers, and
other support. In 2012, the United States and India
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launched a Defense Technology and Trade Initiative
(DTTI) to facilitate military technology transfer as
well as expand defense co-production and co-development, with the aim of making their buyer-seller
relationship more balanced by ending the previous
U.S. “presumption of denial” for Indian defense technology transfer requests.37 Former Defense Secretary
Chuck Hagel said the goal was:
to support the development of a strong and self-sufficient Indian defense industrial base—one that develops mutually beneficial, long-term partnerships with
top American defense companies and helps create jobs
in both our nations.38

The endeavor was originally known as the Carter Initiative, as the then-Deputy Secretary was a driving
force behind the initiative.39 The DTTI, the first agreement of this kind for the Pentagon, has the following
aims:
•

•
•
•

Transform the bilateral defense relationship into
one that is limited only by independent strategic
decisions, rather than bureaucratic obstacles or
inefficient procedures
Strengthen India’s defense industrial base by
moving away from the traditional ‘buyer-seller’
dynamic toward a more collaborative approach
Explore new areas of technological collaboration
from science and technology cooperation through
co-development and co-production
Expand U.S.-Indian business ties40

The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics leads the DTTI in Washington, while at the bilateral level a joint U.S.-India DTTI
Interagency Task Force (DIATF) is the lead oversight
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body. In January 2015, the Pentagon created the India
Rapid Reaction Cell to advance the DTTI, while that
month President Obama and Prime Minister Modi
decided to focus current DTTI efforts on several codevelopment/co-production pathfinder projects.41
Later that year, the United States and India renewed the NFA for another decade.42 The new accord
includes a specific DTTI-related commitment to codevelop and co-produce defense technologies—such
as jet engines, personnel protective gear against biological and chemical weapons, and mobile electric hybrid power sources (solar generators for soldiers in
remote locations such as India’s border mountains).43
This initiative had a slow start, as India rejected the
first dozen projects proposed by the United States
for not providing sufficient technology transfer.44 To
solve this problem, the two parties agreed to pursue
four pathfinder pilot projects involving subsystems
of widely available U.S. military systems that could
expand into a wider and deeper defense industrial
partnership.45 These included co-production of the
unarmed handheld RQ-11 Raven surveillance drone
made by AeroVironment and the manufacture of rollon, roll-off modules for Indian-owned C-130J Super
Hercules military transport aircraft that provided
targeted capabilities for disaster relief, surveillance,
very important person (VIP) transport, and additional missions.46 During Carter’s April 2016 visit to
India, he and Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar agreed to new pathfinder projects for the development of digital helmet-mounted displays and a
lightweight personal protective system (the Uniform
Integrated Protection Ensemble—Increment 2) against
biological and chemical agents.47 These could have a
shorter-term delivery date than the joint systems
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integration projects (connecting new weapons systems with existing platforms) being reviewed under
a Jet Engine Technology Joint Working Group and a
Joint Working Group on Aircraft Carrier Technology
Cooperation. The latter body includes discussions on
aircraft launch and recovery equipment as well as the
technology India wants for its next-generation aircraft
carriers, such as a flat deck with catapults for launching planes.48 Following Parrikar’s June 2016 visit to
the United States, the United States and India signed
an information exchange annex to cover confidential
information sharing on unspecified aspects of carrier designs.49 Meanwhile, in November 2016, India
agreed to buy 145 Lightweight M777 Howitzers, optimal for the Indian Army operation in the country’s
mountainous borders with China and Pakistan, in a
deal structured to promote large-scale co-production.
The Indian Army will acquire 25 U.S.-made turn-key
weapons, while Indian corporations will build the
remaining 120 under license.50
Other future projects might cover ballistic missile
defense (BMD) cooperation, which was emphasized
during the George W. Bush administration, both bilaterally and trilaterally, with Israel as a third partner.51 The Obama administration downplayed BMD
partnership fearing the technologies might disrupt
regional stability in South Asia.52 The 2015 agreement
contained only a passing reference to BMD, but India
has been pursuing the technology with domestic and
other foreign technology.53 The government has been
building a two-tiered BMD system, with a Prithvi
system for high-altitude intercepts at a maximum altitude of 80 km and an Advanced Air Defense system
for intercepts at altitudes under 30 km.54 After considering Israel’s Iron Dome system, India decided to
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buy the Russian S-400 Triumf Air Defense System to
supplement its national systems.55 India has become
the fourth country—after the United States, Israel, and
the Soviet Union/Russia—to construct a multilayer
missile defense system.56
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY TIES
U.S.-Indian defense exchanges have been expanding substantially in number and type—in recent years,
the United States has become the primary foreign
exercise partner of the IAF.57 Bilateral military relations steadily grew after the two countries pooled
their resources in response to a devastating tsunami
that struck India following the massive Indian Ocean
earthquake in December 2004. The following year,
they launched a U.S.-Indian Disaster Relief Initiative.
Building on an already strong civilian relationship,
this initiative aimed to increase coordination of their
military humanitarian relief operations.58 Since then,
the United States and India have augmented their engagement across all military services and with their
civilian defense managers. These include regular
meetings between civilian and military national security leaders, formal military exercises, defense dialogues, and additional interactions. For example, the
DPG, which meets annually, consists of senior civilian
national security leaders as well as some high-ranking officers, while the Defense Joint Working Group
conducts mid-year reviews of the DPG’s progress.59
The MCG, meanwhile, is chaired by general officers
from both countries. Its three ESGs—for the air forces,
armies, and navies, respectively—meet annually to
discuss military-to-military engagements and to plan
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joint exercises, which have become more complex and
frequent in recent years.60
Moreover, soldiers from each country often socialize with one another at scheduled activities such as
sporting events and meals. A U.S. Army officer praised
these engagements and wrote of the Indians: “They
are teaching us their culture and values. . . . It was a
delight to work with the Indian Army because they
are professional, competent soldiers who are able to
teach us a lot and learn from us while doing so.”61 The
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program provides funding to train Indian officers and
officials through Defense and State Department educational projects.62 These institutional ties between militaries provide ballast to political relationships, whose
sustainment can be difficult due to frequent changes
in office. Still, senior-level political intervention may
be needed to achieve lasting results, especially given
that both the United States and India have a steadfast
tradition of civilian control of the military.
The U.S.-Indian naval exercises that began in 1992,
code-named “Malabar,” have focused on increasing
interoperability and developing a common understanding of maritime security procedures. The Clinton administration canceled these exercises in 1998,
following India’s nuclear weapons tests. Bilateral
military partnership revived when the Indian Navy
escorted U.S. vessels through the Strait of Malacca
after the September 2001 terrorist attacks.63 The Malabar exercises, led by the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet based in
Japan, resumed in 2007 and have occurred annually
since then, taking place alternatively in the Western
Pacific and off India’s coast.64 The July 2015 exercise off
Chennai rehearsed carrier strike operations; surface
and anti-submarine warfare; and visit, board, search,
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and seizure (VBSS) operations.65 The week-long June
2016 “Malabar-16” exercise marked the largest iteration of its kind, with 8,000 naval personnel in total.
They engaged in diverse surface, subsurface, anti-air,
and harbor defense drills with the participation of a
U.S. carrier strike group and Indian and U.S. submarines.66 India also sent a naval commander to the U.S.led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multilateral exercise
in 2012, but did not send any vessels.67 In 2014, the
Indian Navy fully participated in RIMPAC, the largest
multinational naval exercise in the Asia-Pacific region,
by sending the INS Sahyadri; the Navy also participated in the 2016 RIMPAC exercise.68
The United States and India share similar maritime security principles regarding the Indian Ocean
and Asia Pacific. Under the 2010 CCI, both countries
agreed to exchange maritime intelligence. The 2015
U.S.-Indian Joint Strategic Vision Statement highlights their shared maritime security principles and
interest in protecting surrounding seas from piracy
and other threats.69 Carter’s June 2015 visit to the city
of Visakhapatnam, where the Indian Navy’s Eastern
Command is located, was the first such trip by a U.S.
Defense Secretary, thereby emphasizing the growing
maritime cooperation between the two countries. In
December 2015, Parrikar became the first Indian Defense Minister to tour U.S. Pacific Command headquarters.70 In February 2016, the United States participated in the International Fleet Review of the Indian
Navy at Visakhapatnam.71 In May 2016, Carter and
Parrikar attended the inaugural Maritime Security
Dialogue in New Delhi, where they exchanged perspectives on maritime security developments in the
region and approved a “white shipping” agreement
to share commercial shipping data.72 The Maritime
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Security Dialogue, which has since met at the assistant secretary-level, has involved the U.S. Defense
and State Departments as well as the Indian Defense
and External Affairs Ministries.73 For India, these joint
maritime exercises and dialogues with the United
States are valuable for enhancing military interoperability, increasing maritime domain awareness, and
learning from the more experienced U.S. Navy.74
Although the two navies are the main military
services participating in U.S.-Indian exercises, the Indian and U.S. ground and air forces also regularly engage in joint drills.75 The U.S. and Indian armies have
held annual Yudh Abhyas (training for war) exercises
since 2004.76 Over time, these drills have grown from
squad- and platoon-level to company- and battalionlevel exercises.77 The 2016 Yudh Abhyas exercise was
held in Uttarakhand, the closest the joint U.S.-Indian
Army drill has ever been to China.78 The Indian Army
and U.S. Marine Corps have also participated in amphibious exercises.79 U.S. and Indian Special Forces,
meanwhile, have held a Balanced Iroquois training
exercise.80 These ground-force drills have focused on
building capacity for counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping.81
(India is one of the leading providers of United Nations [UN] peacekeeping personnel, while the United
States is the main funder of UN peace operations.) The
U.S. Army seeks to use bilateral exercises with the Indian Army to become a more effective counterinsurgency force and to make their coordinated disaster relief efforts more efficient and effective. The U.S. Army
rotates the units that participate in the Yudh Abhyas
exercises to maximize cultural exchanges and interoperability between Indian and U.S. ground forces. The
Indian and U.S. participants have emphasized the value of the personal relationships that they develop.82
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The U.S. and Indian Air Forces coordinate exercises
and other contacts through their bilateral ESG.83 The
two air fleets held their first of several “Cope India”
bilateral exercises in 2004.84 The Indian Air Force has
also participated in the U.S.-led multilateral Red Flag
exercises in 2008 and 2016.85 These drills have mainly
focused on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,
and air-to-air combat.86 Cooperation with India also
provides the U.S. Air Force with an opportunity to test
U.S. fighters against India’s Russian and Europeanmade warplanes, such as India’s Russian-built MiG
29s and Su-30MKIs. Meanwhile, India’s Air Force can
enhance its ability to address regional security challenges and support UN, humanitarian, or noncombatant evacuation missions, like the one India conducted
recently in Yemen, by practicing these operations
with U.S. forces. However, cooperation between the
air forces is less developed than the collaboration between other Indian and U.S. military branches.87 The
Indian Government has not approved some of the exercises and engagements proposed by the ESG, possibly due to cost considerations. The Indian Air Force’s
heavy reliance on Russian military technology also
presents an obstacle to deeper cooperation with the
United States, since some Indian commanders may
be reluctant to showcase their best Russian-provided
fighters, radar, and avionics to the United States for
fear of losing access to Russian suppliers.
The U.S. Congress has taken steps to strengthen bilateral defense ties. For example, the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2017 funds a special office in the
Pentagon focused on the DTTI, authorizes a senior position focused exclusively on the U.S.-Indian defense
relationship, and supports future joint military planning, specifically in humanitarian assistance, counter-
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piracy, maritime security, and co-production/development.88 After Modi’s 2016 visit to the United States,
Congressmen Eliot Engel and Joseph Crowley introduced legislation in the House of Representatives defining India as a Special Global Partner of the United
States and amending the Arms Export Control Act to
benefit India.89 The United States in 2016 designated
India a “Major Defense Partner,” a newly created category to make India a de facto major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, without using that term. According to Carter, the decision “will
facilitate defense, trade and technology sharing with
India on a level we reserve only for our closest friends
and allies.”90 Specifically, the new designation helps
the White House expedite Indian defense licenses and
adds India to an approved category of the Arms Control List, helping India obtain U.S. defense technology
more rapidly.91 The new designation also simplifies
defense investment and gives India license-free access
to dual-use technologies in exchange for strong Indian
export controls.92 Despite India’s new classification,
U.S. law will still regulate intelligence, patents, and
the export of “sensitive technology.”93
COUNTERTERRORISM, CYBER, AND
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
Counterterrorism cooperation between the United
States and India has also expanded in recent years.
In 2000, the two countries created a U.S.-India Joint
Working Group on Counterterrorism. This body has
facilitated the exchange of intelligence on terrorist
financial operations and supported joint training in
border management, surveillance techniques, aviation security, and terrorist incident response involving
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weapons of mass destruction (WMD).94 Through the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, U.S. agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently trained Indian security personnel in counterterrorism activities such as advanced crisis response,
hostage negotiation, incident management, explosive
incident countermeasures, and terrorist interdiction.95
The 2008 Mumbai attacks—in which 6 U.S. citizens
were among the almost 200 dead—spurred greater
U.S.-Indian counterterrorism cooperation, including a
U.S. commitment to pressure Pakistan further on this
issue.96 During the inaugural 2009 U.S.-India Strategic
Dialogue, President Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh explicitly called for eliminating terrorist
safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan.97 The CCI,
launched the following year, has included short- and
long-term projects for enhancing joint counterterrorism capabilities through the sharing of advanced
techniques, best practices, and investigative skills as
well as cooperation between forensic laboratories, reciprocal investigative assistance, and mutual training
and liaison. The CCI has addressed money laundering, terrorist financing, mass transit and rail security,
maritime transportation, and port and border security.98 However, their “Homeland Security Dialogue,”
established in 2011, has yielded few results.99 In 2014,
the United States created a Homeland Security working group under the bilateral High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) with the intent to facilitate
joint access to counterterrorism-related technology.100
The Indian and U.S. intelligence services have collaborated on many regional terrorism threats, such as the
new South Asian branches of al-Qaeda, the Lashkare-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Haqqani
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Network, and the Islamic State—also known as the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its Arabic acronym,
Daesh.101 The Indian and U.S. defense ministries also
discussed these regional terrorist threats at the highest
levels.102 In February 2015, India formally banned ISIS
and its associated organizations under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act.103 On September 22, 2015,
then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Indian
Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj issued
“The U.S.-India Joint Declaration on Combatting Terrorism” as part of their Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (S&CD). The text highlighted shared concerns
about regional terrorist movements, the two countries’ common long-term counterterrorism goals, and
their commitment to complete “a bilateral agreement
to expand intelligence sharing and terrorist watch-list
information.”104 In 2016, their annual Yudh Abhyas exercise focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in mountainous regions.105 Leaders
of both governments recognized that their counterterrorism relationship must evolve to address changes in
threats and technology. In his June 2016 speech to the
U.S. Congress, Modi said that the “traditional tools”
used to fight terrorism are insufficient and that both
countries must “deepen their security cooperation”
through new and diverse methods to combat terrorism.106 Obama also stressed the importance of finding
more creative opportunities for collaboration in counterterrorism.107 During Modi’s visit, he and Obama
signed an agreement providing for enhanced data
exchanges between India’s Multi Agency Centre and
Intelligence Bureau and the FBI’s Terrorist Screening
Center.108
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The Indian and U.S. Governments have recently
increased cooperation against cyberterrorism. The
U.S.-India Cyber Security Forum, established in 2001,
created a framework for dialogue between U.S. and
Indian cyber agencies.109 The United States and India
later launched a Joint Initiative on Cyberterrorism.110
A decade later, the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding that facilitated a more
substantial exchange of cyber information and expertise.111 In 2013, they launched a Strategic Cyber Policy
Dialogue.112 The Framework for the U.S.-India Cyber
Relationship, the first such document the United States
has signed with any foreign government, committed
both countries to various principles such as promoting international law, public-private partnerships,
and appropriate norms of state cyber conduct. The
parties also agreed to deepen cybersecurity collaboration on critical infrastructure protection, malicious
and criminal activity, and to eventually adopt a bilateral cybersecurity cooperation agreement.113 The two
governments have used the U.S.-India Cyber Dialogue
to implement the Framework as well as pursue additional joint cyber projects.114 More recent cooperation
has expanded to further command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) elements.115
In late August 2016, Parrikar visited the U.S. Cyber
Command (CYBERCOM), the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Combat
Command (ACC), and the 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Wing, presumably
to develop partnership opportunities with all these
organizations.116
U.S.-Pakistani ties have complicated U.S.-Indian
counterterrorism cooperation. The Indian Government has repeatedly accused Pakistan, particularly
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the semiautonomous Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
of sponsoring terrorism against Indian targets.117 U.S.
officials, while generally agreeing with these assessments, have felt compelled to cooperate with the ISI,
as they have considered its help critical for defeating
terrorist threats against the United States, especially
against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The 2008 Mumbai
attack deepened Indian apprehensions about a perceived U.S. reluctance to share information detrimental to Pakistan with India. Not only did U.S. authorities deny Indian law enforcement personnel access to
David Headley, a Pakistani-American who participated in the attack, but U.S. media reported that the U.S.
authorities had acquired intelligence about the attack
before it occurred, but had refused to act on it or share
the information with the Indian authorities.118 More
recently, Indians have skeptically viewed Pakistani
Government pledges to U.S. authorities to adopt a
harder line toward terrorism following the December
2014 terrorist attack in Peshawar, which killed more
than 100 Pakistani children.119 In his speech to Congress, Modi pointedly observed that, “while it was a
global problem, terrorism was ‘incubated’ in India’s
neighborhood.”120 However, Indian Governments
have strongly resisted U.S. mediation of its conflict
with Pakistan over Kashmir and other issues that New
Delhi treats as its internal affairs.121 The restricted geographic nature of these threats, issues of feasibility,
and legislative constraints will likely exclude future
U.S.-Indian collaboration on these issues.122
REGIONAL SECURITY
Despite their limited cooperation regarding Pakistan, U.S. defense leaders have come to see India as a
potential partner on a range of regional security issues
22

of concern to Washington.123 In 2012, then-U.S. Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta called India a “linchpin” in the
U.S. pivot to Asia.124 In August 2014, then-Secretary
Hagel observed that, “the United States strongly supports India’s growing global influence and military capability—including its potential as a security provider
from the Indian Ocean to the greater Pacific.”125 India’s
regional partnerships extend to several important U.S.
allies. For instance, India regularly buys weapons and
collaborates on counterterrorism and other security issues with France and other European countries.126 India and Israel have also developed close security ties,
which include joint exercises, counterterrorism collaboration, and Israeli arms sales to India.127 During the
past decade, moreover, Japanese-Indian security ties
have grown to include military exercises, defense industrial cooperation, and energy security (including a
November 2016 civil nuclear cooperation agreement).
Tokyo supports New Delhi’s “Look East” policy and
was instrumental in ensuring India’s participation in
the East Asian Summit. The Japanese Maritime Self
Defense Force (JMSDF) had participated in several of
the annual Malabar maritime exercises and became
a permanent participant in the drills in 2015.128 Japan
has also joined in some multinational regional security initiatives with the United States and India.129 Some
recent activities have extended to include Australia on
a quadrilateral basis.130
Concerns about how the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) would employ its rising economic and
military power have been a key driver of post-Cold
War U.S.-Indian cooperation.131 Sino-Indian relations
reflect a mixture of collaboration and conflict. Bilateral
economic exchanges are increasing, while Beijing and
New Delhi have aligned their policies on important
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global issues such as climate change. India has joined
several Beijing-led development institutions, such as
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; and China
has removed its veto of India becoming a full member
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a
bloc of Eurasian states that also includes China and
most Central Asian countries. The two countries also
engage in modest bilateral defense dialogues and exchanges.132 Yet, Sino-American tensions encompass
territorial conflicts, cyber suspicions, mutual fears of
geopolitical encirclement, competitive diplomacy to
secure third-country support against the other country, and Beijing’s efforts to limit India’s membership
in various international organizations, such as the UN
Security Council (UNSC) and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), that can enhance India’s great power
status. India fought a short border war with China in
1962. Despite years of official negotiations since then,
they have failed to resolve their conflicting territorial
claims. During the Cold War, India was in de facto
alignment with the Soviet Union against the PRC;
now Indians worry about the leverage Beijing gains
over Moscow due to Russia’s growing dependence
on China’s economy, which could allow Beijing to
challenge Russian-Indian ties.133 New Delhi and Beijing still compete for regional influence in South Asia,
especially Bangladesh. Indians and Chinese perceive
each other as maneuvering globally to contain the
other country’s rise. Indians are concerned with the
PRC’s close defense relations with Pakistan and expanding military presence in the Indian Ocean region,
while India’s growing security ties with the United
States, Japan, and other potential Chinese adversaries
make Chinese analysts uneasy.134 India has conducted
multilateral military exercises with Nepal, Indonesia,
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Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Myanmar, and
other members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). Some of these countries hope for
India to act as a modest counterweight to China in the
region.135
For decades, PRC policy has been to fortify Pakistan, India’s main South Asian rival, with economic
and military help to keep New Delhi preoccupied with
Islamabad, allowing Beijing to focus on managing its
more important relationships elsewhere.136 Indian
policymakers have long perceived a trilateral dynamic at work in their relations with China and Pakistan.
When India tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, its
government justified this controversial action by citing the threat presented by China’s military ties with
Pakistan and the PRC’s nuclear weapons capabilities
rather than a direct threat from Islamabad.137 For their
part, Pakistani policymakers see security ties with
China, along with their country’s nuclear capabilities
and terrorist ties, as helping negate New Delhi’s superior conventional military capability. The PRC has
sought to deter India and assure Pakistan through
military and additional assistance, including probable
past assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, but has pushed Islamabad to become more capable of self-defense rather than defending it directly
through extended nuclear deterrence or other means.
China has greater economic and military resources
than India, but PRC policymakers must often manage more economic and strategic relationships due to
China’s global presence and larger number of regional
neighbors. As a result, Indian policymakers typically
appear more concerned with China than PRC policymakers do with India. PRC strategists have regularly
dismissed India as a second-ranked power compared
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to Japan, Russia, and the United States.138 Yet, India’s
growing economic and military superiority relative to
Pakistan has changed this dynamic; PRC policymakers increasingly recognize New Delhi as a more important global player, especially in Asia.139 The United
States has found improving security ties with India
while sustaining good bilateral relations with Pakistan difficult to manage.140 Indians have resented the
billions of dollars in economic and security assistance
Washington has provided Islamabad, while Pakistani
elites traditionally consider Beijing as a more reliable
partner than Washington, which has imposed various
sanctions on Islamabad.141
Though both the United States and India have
eschewed an explicit strategy of containing the PRC,
they recognize that a stronger U.S.-Indian partnership would better position them both to manage their
China challenges. Washington and New Delhi have
overlapping, though not identical, security concerns
regarding Beijing’s growing military power. The United States and India also differ from China in having
democratic political systems.142 Even so, only under
Modi has the Indian Government more visibly joined
U.S. criticism of China, such as expressing shared support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
The 2015 U.S.-India Framework agreement pledges to:
enhance cooperation toward maritime security and
to increase each other’s capability to secure the free
movement of lawful commerce and freedom of navigation across sea lines of communication [SLOC], in
accordance with the principles of international law.143

While visiting India in April 2016, Carter and Parrikar
released a joint statement of intent to ensure “freedom
of navigation and over-flight throughout the region,
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including in the South China Sea.” They also expressed
support for a “rules-based order and regional security
architecture conducive to peace and prosperity” in
the Indo-Asia Pacific region and their commitment
to work with other countries to uphold “security and
stability” in the area.144 Modi used similar language
during his June 2016 visit to Washington.145 The Indian Government has ruled out conducting joint military patrols with the United States or other partners
in the South China Sea.146 The Indian approach may
reflect a reluctance to challenge Beijing in its backyard or to avoid giving the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) Navy another reason to strengthen its presence
in the Indian Ocean in retaliation. However, Obama
observed that:
Whether India decides to operate with us or not, we
are committed to helping India develop that capacity
to protect its own interest and to ensure that the Indian Ocean region is free from the kind of threats to
maritime transport, shipping, the way it is being in the
South China Sea.147

During the 2015 summit of Indian Prime Minister
Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the
two leaders underscored their shared commitment
to securing SLOC, as both countries depend heavily
on SLOC for energy and trade.148 Japan-India defense
industrial cooperation has also gained momentum as
India is purchasing the ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious
aircraft from Japan to upgrade India’s maritime domain awareness and search-and-rescue capabilities.149
Other recent bilateral military initiatives have included joint air force staff talks, agreements on defense
technology transfer, and joint intelligence unit training. India and Japan have also partnered in creating
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strategic rare earth element refinement and processing centers in Odisha and Andhra Pradesh to dilute
China’s near monopoly on these mineral exports.150
Meanwhile, the United States and India have managed their differences regarding Russia, Iran, and other regions. India has deep and longstanding defense
ties with Moscow and has refrained from sanctioning
Russia for the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s or its annexation of Crimea in March
2014.151 Many Russian and Indian elites see their countries as important elements in the multipolar world order that they favor over one led by the United States.
At the multilateral level, both are full members of the
Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) bloc
of emerging economic powers, while Russia has successfully pushed for India to become a full member of
the SCO.152
Russian-Indian cooperation is strongest in the
defense sector. During the Cold War, India bought
more arms from the Soviet Union than from any other
foreign supplier.153 Russian-Indian defense cooperation has remained strong since then due to overlapping geopolitical interests, shared security concerns,
and mutual economic benefits. Arms sales and other
avenues of defense cooperation have been institutionalized in annual meetings of the India-Russia InterGovernmental Commission on Military Technical
Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC).154 Russia has sought to
meet Indian demands that Russia transfer more defense technologies and engage in more joint research,
development, and production of military systems.
Both countries oppose radical Islamic terrorism and
regional instability in Central Asia and conduct regular joint military exercises in both bilateral and multilateral formats.155 Nevertheless, problems in past Rus-
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sian arms sales, India’s growing arms purchases from
the United States, and other factors have constrained
recent Indian purchases of Russian weapons. Meanwhile, the BRICS countries have only achieved modest
economic cooperation through joint declarations and
summits, demonstrating little if any strategic coordination.156 India’s involvement in the SCO has also remained minimal, though this might change when India becomes a full member in 2017. Yet, Indian leaders
have avoided aligning with the United States against
Russia. In addition, Moscow’s strong post-Cold War
security ties with Beijing have remained a serious barrier to Russian-Indian regional security cooperation.157
Moscow’s developing security partnership with Pakistan, promoted by China, could also present a challenge to Russian-Indian collaboration in Afghanistan,
especially since Moscow has begun selling weapons to
Pakistan and conducting joint Russian-Pakistani military exercises.158
U.S. officials have long confronted the difficult balancing act of improving security ties with India while
simultaneously sustaining good bilateral relations
with Pakistan.159 For example, U.S.-Indian collaboration regarding Afghanistan has been constrained by
U.S. concerns about Pakistani sensitivities.160 India has
made major economic, political, and strategic investments in Afghanistan since the Taliban lost power
in 2001, including programs to bolster Afghanistan’s
security capabilities and integrate the country into
regional diplomatic and economic structures. In their
2011 Strategic Partnership Agreement, India agreed
to train Afghan military officers and provide light
weapons useful for counterinsurgency operations.161
Pakistani national security managers have seen India’s presence in Afghanistan as a threat.162 With U.S.
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encouragement, India initially collaborated mostly on
diplomatic and economic initiatives with foreign partners in Afghanistan. More recently, NATO’s declining military presence in Afghanistan has led India to
expand its training and other assistance of the Afghan
National Security Forces.163
Indian-Iranian ties have also troubled U.S. policymakers. Although the Indian Government supported
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
UN sanctions against Iran and decreased oil imports
from Iran, Indians have at times seemed less concerned
than the United States about Iran’s nuclear weapons
activities and have invested in Iran’s Chabahar Port
to gain access to the Persian Gulf.164 Indians share U.S.
fears of nuclear terrorism, but perceive this danger
as emanating more from Pakistan’s militants rather
than Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The 2015 Iranian
nuclear deal reduced U.S.-Indian tensions regarding
Iran.165 U.S. President Donald Trump and members of
his administration have criticized the deal; however,
for now, Iran is fulfilling its terms. India’s dependence
on Persian Gulf energy and employment opportunities for millions of workers has also limited Indian cooperation with U.S. military operations in the Middle
East.166
NUCLEAR ISSUES
Nuclear security cooperation between the United
States and India has historically been limited and
sensitive. During the 1950s, under the Eisenhower administration’s Atoms for Peace program, the United
States helped India develop its nuclear energy sector
by building a nuclear reactor, providing India with
nuclear fuel, and permitting Indian scientists to study
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in the United States.167 However, India resisted U.S.
pressure to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that the treaty privileged
the existing nuclear weapons states. As U.S. policymakers feared, India’s 1974 nuclear test encouraged
Pakistan and other countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons. The United States imposed sanctions
on India and pressed other states to refrain from any
nuclear cooperation with India, even for non-military
purposes. India continued developing its nuclear
weapons program at great financial cost and with its
own state-operated regulation and safeguard regimes.
India’s perseverance in pursuing nuclear technologies despite U.S. sanctions, development of effective
national nuclear safeguards, increased cooperation regarding terrorism and other regional security threats,
and other considerations led the former George W.
Bush administration to pursue a more conciliatory
approach.168 In July 2005, the administration decided
to end the decades-long embargo on nuclear trade
with India. In 2006, with White House backing, the
U.S. Congress passed the Hyde Act to exempt nuclear
cooperation with India from the U.S. Atomic Energy
Act.169 This legislation allowed Congress to adopt a socalled 123 Agreement regarding India the following
year, allowing civil nuclear cooperation between both
states provided India permitted the IAEA to establish
safeguards on a select number of its civilian nuclear
facilities and did not transfer U.S. nuclear material,
related equipment, and technology to third countries
or use them for military purposes. A comprehensive
Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement, which the IAEA
approved, was finalized in October 2008.170 The United
States also persuaded the NSG to make an exemption
for India, allowing its member states to engage in civil
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nuclear trade with India despite New Delhi’s refusal
to join the NPT as long as India continued its unilateral moratorium on further nuclear weapons testing. In
2010, Washington and New Delhi signed an agreement
that allowed India to reprocess spent nuclear reactor
fuel that originated in the United States. Reprocessing
is controversial because the plutonium extracted from
the spent fuel can be used to build nuclear weapons
as well as recycled to manufacture more reactor fuel.
Aside from India, the United States has authorized
only Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to reprocess U.S.-origin uranium.171
India suffers from a perennial energy shortage and
hopes that the nuclear power will provide a quarter of
the country’s energy requirements by 2050.172 Despite
this need and the commitment of the United States
and India to pursue nuclear cooperation, U.S. and
other foreign investment in India’s nuclear sector has
remained low, mostly due to the Indian parliament’s
adoption of an extremely demanding nuclear accident
liability law, in which nuclear suppliers rather than local plant operators are held primarily accountable for
nuclear accidents.173 Only Russia has managed to sell
India foreign nuclear reactors. An agreement reached
during Obama’s January 2015 visit to New Delhi created a state-backed insurance scheme to overcome
Western companies’ concerns about India’s unlimited
liability law. The agreement also included provisions
for IAEA oversight of U.S.-provided nuclear materials to India. During Modi’s June 2016 visit to Washington, the two leaders said India’s ratification of the
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for
Nuclear Damage provides the framework necessary
for a long-term partnership between U.S. and Indian
companies to construct nuclear power plants in India.
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The leaders supported the plans by Westinghouse and
the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. to build
six reactors with the financial support of the Indian
Government and the U.S. Export-Import Bank.174 The
new U.S. approach has encouraged other countries to
also pursue civil nuclear cooperation with India. Japan and India, for instance, signed a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement permitting Japan to transfer civilian nuclear technology to India, which will include
components for the Westinghouse AP1000 reactors
the United States is building in South India.175
Ironically, whereas a decade ago, the United States
and India considered resolving their nuclear-related
differences essential for making mutual progress on
other issues, U.S.-Indian security cooperation has since
progressed sufficiently that regularizing their nuclear
ties is no longer critical. The removal of the U.S. nuclear sanctions on India appears to have proved sufficient
given both countries’ growing collaboration regarding terrorism, regional security, defense industrial
ties, and other issues. Meanwhile, the United States
endorsed India’s membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), finalized in June 2016,
and supports New Delhi’s bid to become a member of
the NSG, which Beijing is blocking.176
LOOKING AHEAD
Despite growing security cooperation, the United
States and India are not natural defense partners. The
leaders of both countries, including national security
ministers and, when necessary, presidents, must actively manage a bilateral relationship that has been
historically troubled, is not a traditional military alliance, and remains focused on compartmentalized
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deals rather than comprehensive programs. Notwithstanding their common strategic interests and shared
democratic values, the United States and India will
remain unequal in military strength and other power
resources. They also have diverging strategic priorities in some areas, such as regarding Pakistan. Indians will generally provide more concrete support for
U.S. goals than their public rhetoric would suggest.
Conversely, U.S. officials should become more vocal
in supporting India’s aspirations to become a permanent UNSC member, demonstrating U.S. conviction
that India deserves greater recognition in the international arena, even if UNSC membership remains out
of reach due to the Chinese veto. President Obama appropriately went out of his way to describe India as
a potential strategic partner on many security issues,
ranging from counterterrorism to climate change.177
Even so, many Indians still question whether U.S. policymakers appreciate that India’s enhanced economicmilitary power and elevated international stature will
benefit U.S. interests despite New Delhi’s firmly independent foreign policy. They also insist that Washington remove remaining bilateral and multinational
restrictions on Indian access to advanced U.S. civilian,
dual-use, and military technologies. Additionally,
they want U.S. policy to treat Pakistan more strictly
while avoiding explicitly linking U.S. policy toward
Pakistan and India.
Recent U.S. and Indian administrations have laid
the basis for further security progress in coming years
despite these differences, provided that both governments continue their comprehensive and sustained
efforts to achieve it. In the last year of the Obama administration, the two governments signed a Logistics
Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)
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during Secretary Carter’s visit to India in April 2016.
The LEMOA is a variant of the Logistics Support
Agreements that the United States has signed with
many foreign military partners, though the LEMOA
was altered to meet the specific nature of the U.S.-Indian defense relationship.178 The agreement allows the
two militaries’ land, air, and naval forces to access the
other country’s defense supplies such as fuel, spare
parts, and services such as maintenance and repair facilities at air and seaports. Parrikar and Carter stated
that the LEMOA “increased strategic and regional cooperation, deepened military-to-military exchanges,
and expanded collaboration on technology and innovation.”179 The LEMOA provides the U.S. Navy and
Air Force with easier access to the South Asian region,
which is useful for U.S. presence, counterterrorism,
and related operations in Asia, while also expanding
India’s military reach, potentially globally. Though
the LEMOA does not oblige either party to pursue
joint activity or provide for formal basing arrangements, it could enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of any joint operations, thus serving both countries’
objectives of increasing their presence in areas where
China’s naval presence is growing.
Indian and U.S. officials see the LEMOA as the
first of several “foundational” bilateral defense cooperation agreements designed to broaden and deepen
the U.S.-Indian security partnership.180 Many Indian
experts have welcomed the LEMOA for enhancing
India’s military capabilities within and beyond South
Asia—making India a better global “net security provider” in general and helping India manage its longterm relationship with China in particular.181 However,
some Indian commentators worry that it makes their
country strategically bound to the United States and
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could entangle New Delhi in Washington’s disputes
with Moscow and Beijing.182 They also oppose U.S.Indian defense agreements as being too intrusive.183
Similar Indian concerns have delayed Indian approval
of the U.S.-proposed Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA),
which would provide India with technologies for encrypted communications, and the Basic Exchange and
Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which encourages
geospatial intelligence collection and sharing. Negotiations over CISMOA have been sporadically underway since 2005; the proposed accord has recently been
renamed the Communications Compatibility and
Security Agreement (COMCASA) at India’s request.
Though the Indian Government has approved these
two agreements, there has been no announcement
regarding when they will be formally signed or put
into effect.184 When asked about the issue during his
last Pentagon news conference, Parrikar recalled that
the two countries had spent at least a dozen years negotiating the LEMOA and said his government first
needed to secure its adoption before trying to achieve
public support for the other deals.185
In addition to completing implementation of these
agreements, the Trump administration could take other steps to develop the U.S.-Indian security agenda.
For instance, the two sides should impart more strategic rationale to the bilateral military exercises beyond
developing tactical proficiencies and interoperability
as ends in themselves.186 Engaging in more substantive bilateral discussions about the desired operational focus of their exercises would provide a means
to enhance the strategic dialogue and joint planning
between the two defense establishments regarding
possible future missions and scenarios. Furthermore,
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the multilateral Malabar maritime exercises should
also fully embrace other foreign partners and rehearse
large multi-service combined exercises and other
high-end missions.187 Opportunities exist for expanding U.S. and Indian naval drills and other collaboration.188 Still, the number of ground exercises should
increase, since the Indian Army receives more than
half of the country’s defense budget while the Navy,
which has been the Pentagon’s most active exercise
partner, receives a considerably smaller percentage.189
Washington and New Delhi also need to make further
progress toward realizing the goal, enunciated in their
September 2014 joint statement, “for the United States
to cooperate with India’s planned National Defense
University” and to “expand military-to-military partnerships including expert exchanges, dialogues, and
joint training and exercises.”190 Congress has adopted
legislation permitting substantial senior-level officer
exchanges, so now the U.S. and Indian defense communities need to implement such programs, which
can form ties that last decades.191 In addition to placing
personnel at major military command headquarters,
they could also exchange civilian managers, military
planners, defense scientists, and technicians.192 In this
regard, the United States should ensure that training,
exchange, and other opportunities engage India’s civilian defense managers. Unlike in Pakistan, where
the lack of civilian control over the security agencies
has created problems for achieving U.S. counterterrorism goals, India’s military is fully subordinate to civilian control; but Indian political leaders could benefit
from more defense education and training. The United
States and India should also develop more joint student and teacher exchange programs for their respective defense educational institutions. Whereas mili-
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tary exercises improve their physical interoperability,
these activities strengthen the cultural and intellectual
readiness of the two national security communities to
cooperate on joint missions.
The U.S.-Indian counterterrorism relationship can
be strengthened and made more effective in meeting
both countries’ security goals by increasing and diversifying cooperation, such as by streamlining intelligence sharing, reviving their lackluster homeland security dialogue (perhaps to include more immigration
issues), and encouraging a freer exchange of creative
ideas on how to combat radicalization. The recent hate
crimes against Indian nationals residing in the United
States underscore how both countries need to address
this issue, which, along with the imperative of managing immigration and outsourcing, challenge U.S.-Indian societal, commercial, and other ties.193 India sent a
high-level delegation to the Nuclear Security Summits
held during the Obama administration.194 U.S.-Indian
cooperation should now extend to constructing the
new global nuclear security architecture needed, following the end of the summits. India can also increase
its funding for IAEA nuclear security programs. The
United States, for its part, should facilitate India’s joining the International Energy Agency (IEA), a group of
29 energy-importing countries.195 In addition to countering WMD trafficking, the United States and India
could also collaborate more on international trafficking issues (of narcotics, weapons, and people) and biological security, such as averting threats to agriculture
or public health in Asia. Some of these collaborative
projects could extend to Africa, since both countries
already train many African agricultural experts independently. At their August 2016 Strategic and Commercial Dialogue in New Delhi, the two governments
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reaffirmed their commitment to sign a cybersecurity
framework agreement, which now falls to the Trump
administration to execute.196
U.S.-Indian defense cooperation has become better institutionalized within the two countries’ national
security establishments, but would still benefit from
high-level political intervention to surmount bureaucratic barriers. In this regard, the departure of
Secretary Carter could present a challenge to the relationship since he was very committed to improving
U.S.-Indian ties and the U.S. arms export program—
and spent more time with Parrikar than with any
other foreign defense minister.197 For this reason, the
policies toward India of the new Trump administration, and his top national security appointments, will
be especially important in shaping the future U.S.-Indian relationship. In dealing with India, Trump’s team
may be deliberating between two choices. The first
approach would be to continue the previous administration’s policies of developing a strategic partnership based on shared values (based on a partnership
between the world’s oldest democracy and the most
populous democracy) and long-term interests. The
second would be pursuing a more short-term transactional economic focus that emphasizes attaining concrete U.S. economic benefits. From a U.S. perspective,
the former approach will be more difficult to achieve
but should be the objective of the new administration;
an expanded defense industrial partnership could
maximize economic efficiency (combining U.S. high
technology with Indians’ lower costs of labor) and
thereby further mutual security interests. The Trump
administration seems well positioned to help increase
U.S. arms exports while meeting India’s defense
autonomy goals. A good indication of the administra-
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tion’s approach may be how it responds to proposals
by Lockheed-Martin and Boeing to shift production
of the F-16 Fighting Falcon and F/A-18 Super Hornet
to India while concentrating production of the more
modern F-35 within the United States.198
A transactional strategy might work better with
Pakistan. Indians and others have called for conditioning more U.S. aid on stronger Pakistani measures
to combat terrorism.199 Washington should also urge
China to render more economic support to Pakistan.
The Trump administration should publicly continue
to de-hyphenate Pakistan and India by addressing
both countries on issues beyond their mutual antagonism. At the same time, U.S. officials should recognize
that strengthening India’s counterterrorism capabilities helps deter Pakistani-backed terrorism against
India, with its inherent escalatory potential.200 In addition to addressing Islamist terrorism, China’s rise,
and other mutual security issues, stronger U.S.-Indian
ties will also help overcome possible U.S.-Indian divergences under Trump over immigration (due to a
portion of India’s population being Muslim), climate
change (India had expected to receive foreign financing and technology to curtail their carbon emissions),
and alarming cases of hate crimes against Indian nationals in the United States.201 Based on his pre-election statements, Trump might also take a harder line
against U.S.-Iranian ties and U.S.-Indian economic
exchanges. Conversely, India’s non-membership in
any formal U.S.-led defense alliance may present less
of a challenge than in the past, since Trump has deemphasized such arrangements. Indian leaders share
Trump’s preference for strategic autonomy and reluctance to let alliance ties impinge on their foreign
policy decision-making. If the Trump administration
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manages to improve relations with Moscow, opportunities for tripartite Russian-U.S.-Indian security cooperation could grow in areas of mutual concern such
as Afghanistan and in countering Islamist extremism.
Even if U.S.-Russian ties remain strained, the United
States should see India’s impending full membership
in the SCO as an opportunity to moderate anti-U.S.
tendencies within that organization. The United States
should incentivize Beijing to discourage Pakistan’s
support for anti-Indian terrorism by playing on Chinese anxieties regarding Islamist terrorism at home
and in neighboring countries.
Several factors could make Afghanistan a more
important area for joint U.S.-Indian counterterrorism cooperation. The United States and India have an
interest in ensuring that Afghanistan does not serve
as a launching pad for terrorist attacks against either
country. In line with its declared policy of rebalancing U.S. defense cooperation, the United States should
encourage India to provide more extensive and direct
assistance for the development of the Afghan National Security Forces as well as cooperate with the United
States and other countries to reduce Central Asian
countries’ vulnerability to terrorism. In addition, India
can undertake projects to improve the capacity and efficiency of Afghan governance institutions. Such cost
sharing and pooling of resources would deepen and
reinforce U.S.-Indian ties. Although Pakistan would
object to this cooperation, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship has become both more stable and less important
over time. In addition, the Pakistani leadership will be
cautious about antagonizing the new U.S. administration, given its firm stance against Islamist terrorism
and unpredictable regional security policies. Trump
would do well to stress in public that U.S. policy
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de-hyphenates the India-Pakistan relationship—meeting Indian demands to be treated as a great power in
its own right. Spending much diplomatic capital to
solve the Kashmir crisis is unwise since Indian-Pakistani tensions would persist even if their disputes
were resolved. Still, it is clearly important that the
United States use whatever tools available to avert a
major conflict between India and Pakistan that could
result in a nuclear war in South Asia involving more
than a billion people. The proximity of the Indian and
Pakistani nuclear forces, their deep mutual antagonisms, suspicions, and the vulnerability of both forces
to preemptive attack already raise the risk of nuclear
escalation. U.S.-Indian and U.S.-Pakistani defense ties
could prove critical for early warning of impending
conflict, crisis management, escalation control, and
then dispute resolution. The Trump administration
will likely press New Delhi to participate in the U.S.led international coalition against the Islamic State,
which now includes some 68 countries.202 Indian
policymakers should consider doing so, especially
as the terrorist group is striving to gain a foothold in
South Asia.203 Building on their new presidential hot
line, the United States and India should co-develop
a crisis management strategy for handling major terrorist incidents and other regional threats. Improved
information sharing in crises will enhance mutual
risk mitigation and promote a more rapid and effective joint response. Increasing cooperation with Australia, Japan, NATO, and other third partners would
also expand the impact of the U.S.-Indian security
partnership.204
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To meet the Trump administration’s expected focus on expanding U.S. exports and achieving more
balanced foreign economic partnerships, the two
countries should execute their plans to facilitate U.S.
civil nuclear energy sales to India. Furthermore, the
two governments should continue to build on the ties
presented by the Indian diaspora in the United States.
A new initiative might secure a U.S.-India bilateral
trade and investment treaty.205 In the security domain,
India should raise its defense FDI ceiling to international standards and relax some of its offset requirements. For example, Indian officials need to specify
when 100 percent FDI is permissible in the country’s
defense sector. Indian and U.S. officials should also
consider how to strengthen barriers against the unauthorized transfer of U.S. military technology to third
parties. Defense exports to any country raise some
risk that other rival countries will gain access to U.S.
military secrets.206 Another potential risk is that, at
some point, Indian defense exporters could emerge
as low-cost competitors of U.S. defense companies
in the same way South Korea and other recipients of
U.S. defense technology transfers have. On the whole,
however, the United States benefits from reinforcing
Indian capabilities to fight terrorism and deter great
power threats in Asia, while low-cost Indian components could, with appropriate quality control, help
reduce the costs to U.S. companies of relying on the
international defense supply chain. The United States
should continue to modernize its defense export controls, which still restrict items Indians can purchase
from other suppliers.207
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Figure I-1. Yearly Military Expenditure of India in Constant (2014) USD, 1988 to 2015.

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed September 9, 2016.
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Figure I-2. Total Yearly Trend Indicator Values of Arms Imports of India, 1950 to 2015.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, accessed September 9, 2016.

73

Figure I-3. Russian and U.S. Share of Indian Arms Imports Trend Indicator Values,
1950-2015.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, accessed September 9, 2016.
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Figure I-4. Russian and U.S. Share of Indian Arms Imports Trend Indicator Values,
1985-2015.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, accessed September 9, 2016.
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